Financial Fragility and Economic Fluctuations: Numerical Simulations and Policy Implications by Serena Sordi & Alessandro Vercelli
    
      Università degli Studi di Siena 
      DIPARTIMENTO DI ECONOMIA POLITICA 
  
       SERENA SORDI 
       ALESSANDRO  VERCELLI 
         
         
           
           
 
          
        
       Financial Fragility and Economic Fluctuations:  
        Numerical  Simulations and Policy Implications 
        




               












Abstract: This paper proposes a simple prototype model that describes the complex dynamics 
of a sophisticated monetary economy. The interaction between the current and intertemporal 
financial constraints of economic units brings about irregular fluctuations at the micro and 
macro levels. By means of qualitative dynamic analysis and numerical simulations, we 
reformulate in more operational terms, and extend in a number of new directions, the model 
suggested recently by one of the authors (Vercelli, 2000) to study the interaction between 
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1  Introduction 
  In a sophisticated monetary economy the interaction between current and inter-
temporal financial constraints generates cyclical fluctuations characterised by dynamic 
instability. This has been pointed out by a prestigious and diversified tradition of 
thought including, among others, Wicksell (1898), Irving Fisher (1933), Keynes (1936), 
and Minsky (1982). What in our opinion has not been thoroughly analysed is the role of 
structural instability in this process. In this paper we intend to contribute to this analysis 
by interpreting the financial fragility of economic units not as an index of dynamic 
instability, as is usual in the literature mentioned above, but as an index of structural 
instability. In fact, the higher the degree of financial fragility the smaller the size of the 
shock that is sufficient to bring about a structural change in the behaviour of the unit.
1 
For well known reasons (well analysed by Minsky, 1982), the fragility of financial units 
fluctuates pro-cyclically with the financial fluctuations, increasing progressively in the 
boom phase the danger of a severe financial crisis. This raises an awkward dilemma for 
policy: when and how is it necessary to thwart the boom in order to avoid over-invest-
ment and an ensuing financial crisis? In order to answer this question it is crucial to un-
derstand the nature of the feedback between dynamic and structural financial instability. 
  To this end, we present a model that tries to capture in the simplest possible way the 
nexus between the financial fragility of economic units, conceived in terms of structural 
instability, and dynamically unstable financial fluctuations. 
  The approach here adopted is based on that suggested recently by one of the authors 
(Vercelli, 2000). The original model was formalised in such a way as to render it 
intuitively understandable in economic terms, while the model elaborated here is 
expressed in more operational terms in order to facilitate the application of standard 
mathematical techniques such as qualitative dynamic analysis and numerical methods. 
We hope that in this version the approach may better reveal its constructive potential 
and act as a starting point for more complex and detailed analyses. To this end we have 
retained as far as possible the simplicity of the original model, aiming at capturing what 
we believe to be the essential mechanism of financial fluctuations and crisis: the 
interaction between current and intertemporal financial conditions. If this building block 
                                                      
1 We define a system as structurally unstable whenever in consequence of a small shock ε it changes the 
qualitative properties of its dynamic behaviour. We have introduced elsewhere (Vercelli 1991 and 2001) 
the distinction between structural instability in the strict mathematical sense when the shock ε is 
infinitesimal, and ε-instability when the shock is small but finite. In the latter case ε measures the 
minimum size of a shock that brings about a qualitative change in the dynamic behaviour of the system. 
The concept of structural instability here utilised is that of ε-instability.  
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can withstand critical scrutiny, other important features of financial fluctuations and 
crises may be added in the future. 
  The structure of the paper is as follows. First, in Section 2, Vercelli’s original 
heuristic model of the dynamic behaviour of a financial unit is restated and its (local) 
stability properties are analysed in some detail. The dynamic behaviour of the model is 
based on the feedback between the current financial flows of a financial unit and its 
financial fragility. Such feedback is shown to bring about dynamically unstable 
fluctuations in the behaviour of the unit and, as a consequence, the possibility of 
bankruptcy. In Section 3 a simpler variant of the original model is suggested in order to 
facilitate the aggregation of the behaviour of the single units. In Section 4 the modified 
model is taken as a basis for deriving, through trivial but rigorous aggregation 
procedures, its macroeconomic counterpart. The macro model so obtained is a piecewise 
linear system such that the explosive fluctuations in the behaviour of single financial 
units generally translate into persistent fluctuations of the aggregate financial variables. 
In Section 5 the main implications of the dynamic behaviour of the aggregate model are 
shown and interpreted by means of numerical simulations. In Section 6 a few policy 
implications of the aggregate model are discussed in some detail. In Section 7 some 
concluding remarks on the potential and the limits of the approach here outlined are 
briefly sketched. 
2  Dynamic behaviour of the financial units 
  In this paper all decision makers are modelled as financial units. The rationale of this 
approach rests on the observation that the financial constraints and objectives of 
economic agents have assumed a crucial role in shaping their behaviour. This is a long-
run process already pointed out, among others, by Wicksell (1898) and Keynes (1936) 
that has accelerated in the last two decades. The Financial Intensity Ratio of Goldsmith 
(FIR), i.e. the ratio between financial and real wealth, doubled in this period in the 
USA, UK, and France (where the FIR reached values between 2.1 and 2.9 %) and 
increased almost as much in Italy and Germany (where the FIR reached values between 
1.3 and 1.4%) (Nardozzi, 2002, p. 15). This trend has been observed not only in 
corporations but also in households. For example, the ratio of stocks to household 
wealth exceeded 55% in the U.K., 40% in the USA, 30% in France and Italy (ibidem, p. 
17). The analysis of the financial determinants of economic behaviour is therefore 
becoming a general issue that should not be confined to financial corporations.  
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  In this paper we seek to focus in particular on the interaction between the decisions 
of financial units and their current and intertemporal financial constraints, without 
examining the details of their decision-making processes.  
  Each financial unit i is characterised in each period t by a certain amount of financial 
outflows eit in consequence of its purchases of goods and services, and financial inflows 
yit from the sale of its goods and services. The current financial ratio kit is then defined 
as the ratio between total financial outflows and total financial inflows realised by the 











  When this ratio is greater than one, the financial unit reduces the current outflows or 
increases debt (i.e. the commitment to future outflows) or a mix of the two. This, in 
turn, affects the financial constraints faced by the unit in the future. 
  To take account of this, we consider, as the crucial variable that defines the 
financial robustness of the financial unit i, its intertemporal financial ratio, i.e., the ratio 
between the sum of discounted expected outflows and the sum of discounted expected 
inflows. 
 If  r stands for the interest rate, 
*
it k  for the intertemporal financial ratio, and 
*
it n e +  and 
*































where, for n = 0, 
*
it it ee = and 
*
it it yy =  (Vercelli 2000, pp. 144-145). 
  Given this definition it follows that the condition for financial sustainability of the 




it k ≤  
 
  We may now define the financial fragility of a unit as its structural sensitivity to 
shocks (in the sense of ε-structural instability defined in footnote 1), whose degree is 
measured by the minimum shock that would jeopardize its solvency. In our case, 
therefore, the degree of financial fragility is measured by 1
*
it k − . In this definition 
financial fragility defines the structural instability of the financial unit, i.e. the distance  
  4
from the threshold that by definition changes the qualitative characteristics of its 
behaviour. 
  If we suppose that each unit defines a desired value of financial fragility (1−µi) 
beyond which it is reluctant to go, taking account of the risk of its financial position and 
its degree of risk aversion, we have that whenever  1
*
it i k ≥− µ , the financial unit reacts 
by reducing kit in order to reduce 
*
it k . On the other hand, whenever  1
*
it i k <− µ , the 
financial unit tends to increase the size of its investment which implies an increase in kit. 
Of course the larger is µi the lower the probability of a shock of larger size jeopardizing 
its solvency. The choice of µi is related to the degree of risk aversion. Risk lovers would 
choose a negative µi (Ponzi finance) hoping in a positive shock, but we can assume that 
in general most financial units choose a sufficiently large µi to be fairly safe. 
  The simple feedback mechanism between kit and 
*
it k  we have just described is 





















+ −  =− − −  α µ    (2) 
 
where α, β > 0 for all i.
2 
  Equations (1) and (2) define the dynamics of the monetary economy under 
consideration. The equilibrium points (or steady states) of the model  economy – 
obtained by setting  1
** *
it it i kk k + == and  1 it it i kk k + = =  in (1) and (2) – are the origin of the 
axes and Pi = (1 − µi, 1). In order to determine their nature, we consider the Jacobian 
























ii k, k J  at the origin, we obtain: 
 
                                                      
2 Equations (1) and (2) are the same as in the original formulation of the model (Vercelli 2000, p. 147), 
apart from the fact that we have left out the exogenous shocks which appear in both right-hand sides. 
Though from the very beginning of this paper we have assumed the existence of shocks that intervene in 
the crucial definition of financial fragility, we do not need at this stage to make explicit their existence in 
the equations of the model.  
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so that the eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix in this case are always real and distinct 














  Thus, we can conclude that, for 0 < β < 2, the origin is a saddle point, whereas for β 
> 2 the origin is an unstable node. In Fig. 1(a), for example, where α = β = 0.1 < 2, the 
origin of the axes proves to be a saddle point.
3 
  On the other hand, computing  ( )
*
ii k, k J  at Pi, we obtain: 
 













  Thus, in this case, the characteristic equation is: 
 
  ()
2 21 1 0 i λ−λ ++ − = αβ µ  
 
such that the eigenvalues are two complex conjugate  numbers, greater than one in 
modulus: 
 
  () 12 11 ,i i λ= ± − αβµ  
 
  We can then conclude that Pi is an unstable focus (see Fig. 1(a),(b)). As a 
consequence, in the region of validity of the linear approximation, the financial 
fluctuations resulting at the microeconomic level from the interaction between the 





                                                      
3 All figures and simulations presented in the paper can be easily reproduced with simple MATLAB 






Fig. 1. (a) Phase diagram for the dynamic system (1)-(2) of the original model with α = 0.1, β = 0.1, µi = 
0.25 and initial conditions (0.1, 0.05), (0.7, 0.9) and (b) 
*
it k  and kit versus time with initial condition (0.7, 
0.9) 
 
3  The dynamics of the financial unit: an alternative formulation 
  Before proceeding with our investigation, it is convenient to simplify the dynamic 
system (1)-(2) by expressing the feedback between the two variables kit and 
*
it k  in terms 
of  first differences rather than growth rates. While preserving its basic economic  
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contents, this simpler formulation will allow us to concentrate on the aggregate features 
of the model since, as will become apparent in the next section, it will simplify the 
derivation of the corresponding macroeconomic model. 
  Writing first differences rather than growth rates in the left-hand sides of both (1) 
and (2), the dynamic system becomes: 
 
  ( ) 1 1
**
it it it kk k + =+ − β    (3) 
  () 1 1
*
it it it i kk k +   =− − −   α µ    (4) 
 
  What we have obtained is a linear dynamic system which has, as a unique steady 
state, the positive equilibrium  i P  of the original model. Moreover, as in the original 
model, the latter proves to be an unstable focus.
4 
  Thanks to its simplicity, this alternative formulation of the feedback between the 
current and the intertemporal financial ratio is more suitable than the original one for 
investigating the consequences of further modifications and extensions of the model. To 
introduce one of these, let us notice that in (4), it is assumed that the financial unit 
adjusts its current financial ratio depending on the deviation of the intertemporal 
financial ratio from the desired level. As in the original model, moreover, it is assumed 
that the adjustment always takes place at a constant velocity, independently of how far 
the intertemporal financial ratio is from the desired level  ( ) 1 i −µ . A possible, more 
plausible, alternative is to assume that the adjustment of the current financial ratio takes 
place at a speed that does positively depend on the absolute value of the deviation of the 
intertemporal financial ratio from ( ) 1 i −µ : 
 
  () ()
* 1 it i k =− − α αµ  
 
where  () 0 ′ ⋅≥ α , or, by taking a linear approximation: 
 
  () () ()
**
01 11 it i it i kk −− ≈ + −− α µα α µ  (5) 
 
where  0 0 > α  and  1 0 ≥ α . 
  Inserting (5) in (4) we obtain the following modified version of the second equation 
of the dynamic system of our model: 
                                                      
4 Indeed, if we write the homogeneous system in matrix form, and we indicate the coefficient matrix with 
A, then we find that tr(A) = 2 and det(A) = 1 + αβ > 1. Thus, the discriminant of the characteristic 
equation is always negative and the two conjugate complex roots are always greater than one in modulus. 




Fig. 2. The non-linear adjustment of the current financial rate to the difference between the intertemporal 
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1s i g n 1 1
** *
it it it i it i it i
** *
it it i it i it i
kk k k k
kk k k
+   =− − − − − − − −  
   =− − − − − − − −   
αµ α µ µ
αµ α µ µ
 (4′) 
 
  As shown in Fig. 2, this modification simply implies that, unlike in the previous case 
that is also drawn in the figure for comparison, the relation between the adjustment 
1 it it kk + −  and the difference  ( )
* 1 it i k −− µ  is now non-linear: the more (the less) in 
absolute value the intertemporal financial ratio is away from its desired level, the more 
(the less), in proportion, the financial unit is willing to vary its current financial ratio.
5  
  An important feature of this non-linear specification is that, although it contains the 
modulus  ()
* 1 it i k −− µ , Pi is still a steady state of the modified dynamic system (3)-(4′). 
Moreover, the right-hand side of (4′) is differentiable at Pi and such that: 
 













+  =− − − − − − =−  α αµ µ α  
                                                      






Fig. 3. (a) Phase diagram for the dynamic system (3)-(4′) with α0 = 0.1, α1 = 0.05, β = 0.1, µi = 0.25 and 
initial condition (0.7, 0.9) and (b) 
*
it k  and kit versus time 
 
 
  Thus, apart from the change in notation from α to α0, the non-linear specification of 
the adjustment mechanism we have introduced has no effect on the Jacobian of the 
dynamic system at the steady state Pi. As a consequence, the stability properties of the 
linear dynamic system (3)-(4) remain valid for the modified non-linear dynamic system 
(3)-(4′). The results of the numerical simulations for the modified model are shown in 
Figs. 3(a),(b).  
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  To sum up, it is worth stressing that all versions of the model we have considered 
seem to confirm the basic dynamic instability of the fluctuations generated by the 
interaction between the current and intertemporal financial constraints faced by 
financial units in a sophisticated monetary economy. It seems remarkable, in particular, 
that such instability characterises the model even in the last case we have analysed, i.e., 
under the hypothesis of more reasonable behaviour on the part of financial units and 
neglecting the “irrational exuberance” that characterises the expectations of financial 
units in the boom. 
  An important consequence of this intrinsic dynamic instability of the system is that, 
in the absence of constraints or interventions, sooner or later the financial unit will reach 
the zone characterised by financial unsustainability (i.e., where 
* 1 it k > ). When this 
happens, if the unit does not succeed in coming back very quickly to the region of 
financial sustainability, it is bound to become virtually insolvent and to go bankrupt 
unless it obtains further credit from other units. 
  Since in the present framework the existence of stocks is not explicitly considered we 
can represent what happens when a financial unit goes bankrupt simply by assuming 
that the dynamic system (3)-(4′) only holds until the intertemporal financial ratio of the 
unit is less than or equal to a certain value ( ) 1 i +δ , which we take to represent the 
maximum financial exposure of a certain unit accepted by its creditors. This refinement 
of the model redefines the financial fragility of the economic unit as ( ) 1
*
ii t k +− δ , where 
the parameter δi may be positive or negative depending on its financial position and 
reliability. In what follows, for simplicity, we assume that the distribution of firms’ 
financial positions is such that, on average, δi is equal to zero. 
  The consequences of such a change for the dynamics of the current and intertemporal 
financial ratios may be appreciated by examining Figs. 4(a),(b). Of course, a thorough 
modelling of the bankruptcy process would require a more sophisticated model. 
However, the figures illustrate the basic idea of bankruptcy that occurs when a financial 
unit has reached the maximum financial exposure accepted by its creditors, which is 
represented in the figures by the vertical straight lines at ( ) 1 i +δ  and is forced to 
converge rapidly towards economic irrelevance (what is often called the “death” of the 
financial unit).
6 
                                                      
6 Of course, while a few financial units “die”, others “are born”. The “demography” of financial units is 
believed to be very important to account for the actual dynamics of the economic system (Delli Gatti et 
al., 2003). However, for the sake of simplicity, in this early stage of implementation of the model it is 






Fig. 4. (a) Phase diagram using the modified version of the model with bankruptcy with α0 = 0.1, α1 = 
0.05, β = 0.1, µ = 0.25, δi = 0.1 and initial condition (0.7, 0.9); (b) 
*
it k  and kit versus time 
 
4  The dynamic system for the entire economy 
  As we have already stressed, the formulation of the model with first differences of 
the variables in the left-hand side rather than growth rates, makes it much easier to 
aggregate the micro behaviour of financial units in order to represent the financial  
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behaviour of the economy as a whole. Thus, it provides rigorous, though trivial, micro-
foundations to the analysis of macroeconomic behaviour and policy. 
  In fact the micro system represented by equations (3) and (4) is linear and therefore 
makes it straightforward to calculate the average values of the variables. In order to do 
so, let s denote the number of financial units operating in the economy. Then, summing 



















it it it i
ii i i
kk k s +
== = =
 
=− − −  
  ∑∑ ∑ ∑ αµ  (7) 
 
  Finally, from (6) and (7), using Kt and 
*
t K to denote the average current and 











== == ∑∑ , 
 
we obtain for the entire economy: 
 
  ( ) 1 1
**
tt t KK K + =+ − β    (8) 
  () 1 1
*





i i= =∑ µµ . 
  We may show that the dynamic system (8)-(9) is a good approximation of the 
dynamic system for the entire economy even when the financial units follow a more 
sophisticated adjustment mechanism as in (3)-(4′). Indeed, the only difference is that, 
from (4′), summing over the s financial units, one obtains: 
 
  () () ()
2 ** *
10 1
11 1 1 1
sign 1 1
ss s s s
it it it i it i it i
ii i i i
kk k s k k +
== = = =
   =− − − − − − − −      ∑∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ αµ αµ µ  
 





















  −− −−  
 =− − − − 
∑αµ µ
αµ  (9′) 
 
  Clearly, the more financial units operate close to their desired value of financial 
fragility and/or – of course – the smaller is α1, the closer the right-hand side of (9′) is to 
the right-hand side of (9). In what follows we assume that this is the case and we use 
equations (8) and (9) in order to study the dynamics of the entire economy. 
  Microeconomic financial fragility may now be defined as the size of the minimal 
shock that induces a financial unit to go bankrupt ( ) 1
*
ii t k +− δ , while macroeconomic 
financial fragility may be defined as the size of the minimal shock that makes the 
economic dynamics unsustainable, demanding immediate and drastic policy 
interventions in order to push the economy back into the sustainable area.
7 
  In our aggregate model economy the system as a whole never enters the region with 
an intertemporal financial ratio greater than one since we have assumed that the 
financial units go bankrupt as soon as they hit their crucial barrier 1 + δi and that the 
mean value of δi is zero.
 This assumption forces us to reformulate the first of the two 
equations of the aggregate dynamic system. Indeed, the right-hand side of (8) is valid 
only if it is less than or equal to one. Otherwise, it is forced to be equal to one. To 
formalise this discontinuous dynamics of the average intertemporal financial ratio, we 
re-write equation (8) as: 
 
  () ( )
1
1      if  1 1











or, in shorter notation: 
 
   ( ) { } 1 min 1 1
**
tt t KK K , + =+ − β  (8′) 
 
which is a piecewise linear equation. 
  It is not difficult to understand that such a change, which is tantamount to 
considering a “ceiling” for the aggregate intertemporal financial ratio, has very impor- 
                                                      
7 Under the pressure of competition and imitation, financial units are pushed to increase their financial 
exposure in order to maximise consumption and/or investment to the point where the marginal expected 
returns of further exposure equals the marginal risk premium. The risk is related to the probability that a 
shock may increase the intertemporal financial ratio over the threshold 1 + δi . The larger is µi the lower 






Fig 5. (a) Phase diagram for the entire economy using the modified (piecewise linear) version of the 
model with α = 0.1, β = 0.1, µ = 0.25 and (b) Kt and 
*
t K  versus time 
 
 
tant consequences for the dynamics of the system.
8 As shown in Figs. 5(a),(b), when we 
simulate the dynamic system (8′)-(9), the dynamically unstable fluctuations become 
persistent. 
                                                      
8 Unstable linear models of this kind, with “ceilings” and/or “floors” for certain variables, have been 
recently extensively examined in the literature, for example, by Hommes in the context of Hicks’ 1950  
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5  Implications for the overall financial aggregates of the economy 
  We intend now to analyse the implications of the dynamics of the current and 
intertemporal financial ratios for the financial aggregates of the entire economy. In 
order to do so, we note that the aggregate outflows of the private sector of the economy 
at time t, which we denote by Et, are the sum of an endogenous component, private 
aggregate outflows, 
pr
t E , and an exogenous component: public net outflows 
pu
t E  that 
correspond to the sum of deficit spending (Dt = Gt – Tt, i.e. public expenditure minus 
revenues from taxation and other inflows from the private sector, etc.)
9 and the change 
in the quantity of money in circulation ∆Mt. If the net public outflows are positive they 
translate into an equal additional amount of private inflows and vice versa. This defines 
two different policy regimes that are crucial in determining the qualitative 
characteristics of the dynamic behaviour of the macro system: an “inflationary regime”, 
when 0
pu
tt t EDM =+ ∆> , and a “deflationary regime”, when  0
pu
t E < . 
  The aggregate outflows Et translate into contemporaneous aggregate inflows Yt since, 
from the accounting point of view, the cash outflow of the buyer is identically equal to 
the cash inflow of the seller. On the contrary we may assume that there is a lag of one 
period between the realised inflows and the realised outflows of the financial units and 
therefore of the corresponding aggregates (Vercelli 2000, p. 149). Thus, the dynamic 
behaviour of cash flow aggregates is determined by the following system: 
 
  tt YE =    (10) 
  () 11 ;
pu
tt t t tt EK Y E f YK −− =+ =    (11) 
 
where the dynamics of Kt is determined by equations (8′) and (9). 
  This model may be interpreted as the financial counterpart of the simple Keynesian 
income-expenditure model underlying the multiplier (see Vercelli, 1991 and 2000) (Fig. 
6). The main difference, at the same time formal and substantial, is that in the simple 
Keynesian model, the slope of the aggregate demand line – given by the marginal 
propensity to consume – is fairly stable along the business cycle and it is very unlikely 
to be or become larger than one. As a consequence, the equilibrium of the model is 
dynamically stable. On the contrary, in the model we are now considering, the financial 
counterpart of such a slope, given by the average current financial ratio, tends to 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
trade cycle theory (Hommes 1993, 1994, 1995). See also Sordi (2003), where piecewise linear dynamical 
systems are analysed in the context of Goodwin’s (1951) non-linear accelerator model. 
9 Taxation in turn may be considered as the product of the aggregate inflows of the private sector 
multiplied by the average tax rate t: Tt = tYt (see Fig. 6).  
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Fig. 6. The aggregate inflows-outflows interaction 
 
 
oscillate pro-cyclically with the financial cycle and is very likely to become greater than 
one in the boom, thus making the system dynamically unstable in this phase. In 
addition, generally speaking, the shocks that impinge on the financial side of the 
economy are usually more frequent and larger than the real shocks. This comparison 
clarifies why the study of the financial side of the economy is so important if the 
purpose is to detect and control its intrinsic instability. 
  As we have already stressed, the dynamics of the model depends crucially on the 
policy regime. This may be clearly seen if we analyse and compare the dynamic 
behaviour of the system under the two above-mentioned regimes. First of all, by means 
of numerical simulations (represented graphically with the help of cobweb-type 
diagrams), we may show that in the inflationary regime, when the initial conditions are 
above equilibrium and Kt < 1, we have a depression characterised by dynamic stability. 
However the depression endogenously transforms itself in an expansion characterised 
by dynamic instability as a consequence of the progressive increase in Kt triggered by 
the feedback mechanism between Kt and 
*
t K  described by equation (8′) and (9). When 
the initial conditions are below equilibrium and initially Kt < 1 we have an expansion 
characterised by dynamic stability which endogenously transforms itself into an 
expansion characterised by dynamic instability, with an increasing Kt,  until  Kt 
diminishes under the unity triggering a new depression.  
  The first iterations for the two cases with initial values of aggregate inflows 
respectively greater and smaller than the initial equilibrium level – and an initial 
average current financial ratio less than one, are shown in Fig. 7. 
 
  1 
 Kt 
  -t 
L









Fig. 7. First iterations (n = 5) of equations (10)-(11) with 
pu E = 50 > 0 and initial conditions Y0 = 350, Y0′ 
= 50 and K1 = 0.75 < 1 
 
 
  However, this is not the end of the story as is clearly shown in the Figs. 8, 9, 10, and 
11 where more iterations are considered. 
  In the case depicted in Fig. 8 the dynamically stable expansion endogenously 
transforms itself into a boom characterised by dynamic instability. This happens also in 
the case of a dynamically stable recession that transforms itself into a recovery 
characterised by dynamic stability (see Fig. 9) and, then, as soon as Kt becomes greater 
than one, into a boom characterised by dynamic instability. An aspect of the dynamics 
of the model economy worth stressing is that the transition from the recovery phase to 
the boom that we have just described is characterised by a radical structural change 
which modifies the dynamic characteristics of the system. As soon as K reaches a value 
greater than one, the equilibrium suddenly shifts to the South-West quadrant becoming 
unfeasible and at the same time dynamically unstable. On the basis of the feedback 
mechanisms considered in (8′) and (9), however, we know that in the boom both K and 
* K increase until




Fig. 8. More iterations (n = 20) of equations (10)-(11) with 
pu E = 50 > 0 and initial conditions Y0 = 350, 








Fig. 10. The dynamic behaviour of the cash flow aggregates (n = 2000), neglecting the first 500 iterations, 




Fig. 11. Sample enlargements of portions of Figure 10  
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  As soon as K again becomes smaller than unity, the recovery may begin and the 
transition is once more characterised by an endogenous structural change such that the 
equilibrium again moves to the North-East quadrant and becomes dynamically stable. 
Given our representation in terms of a piecewise linear system, we know that the 
cyclical fluctuations of the current and intertemporal aggregate financial ratios start 
again along lines similar to those of the preceding cycle with the consequences for the 
overall financial aggregates of the economy shown in Figs. 10 and 11. In short, the 
persistence of the fluctuations in the average current and intertemporal financial ratios 
leads to very irregular fluctuations of the overall financial aggregates of the economy. 
  As for the “deflationary regime”, it is important to stress that there is a crucial 
difference with respect to the case of the “inflationary regime” so far analysed. The 
main difference is that in the case of a “deflationary regime” there is a serious risk that 
the system becomes trapped in a path of downward dynamic instability. In this case, as 
shown in Fig. 12 and, on a larger scale, in Fig. 13, it may happen that – notwithstanding 
the progressive increase in Kt, which, sooner or later, becomes greater than one – the 
economic system continues to deflate. 
  This “deflationary trap” may be interpreted as a simple formal representation of the 
“debt-deflation” mechanism that, according to Irving Fisher (1933), characterised the 
Great Depression of the 1930s and, according to Minsky (1982), is typical of the most 
severe financial crises. In fact, in a deflationary regime a reduction of inflows of a 
financial unit is bound to induce a reduction of its outflows and so on. Only an injection 
of extra inflows in the form of more expenditure or more money from outside the 
private sector may reverse the vicious circle. 
  The unstable dynamic behaviour of the economic system under the two policy 
regimes has policy implications that we intend to discuss in the next section. 
6   Policy  implications 
  The economic fluctuations described in the model elaborated in the preceding 
sections tend to push at the end of the boom many financial units, and consequently the 
entire economy, into the area of pronounced financial fragility, i.e. very near the barrier 
of pathological structural change. In this situation a very small negative shock may be 
enough to bankrupt the most fragile financial units and to trigger a generalised financial 
crisis that may lead to a severe recession or even a depression. This situation typically 
occurs for each financial cycle of sizeable length and magnitude. The boom nurtures 




Fig. 12. First iterations (n = 18) of equations (10)-(11) with 
pu E = −50 < 0, with initial conditions Y0 = 




Fig. 13. Enlargement of a portion of Fig. 12  
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for expenditure, investment and growth. 
  In recent times pathological structural change was triggered, especially in the case of 
relatively weak units or sectors or economies, even when they were still relatively far 
from the crucial barrier of financial unsustainability. In fact an increasing propensity to 
herd behaviour favoured by the globalisation of capital markets and the ensuing massive 
and precipitous shifts of hot money from one firm or sector or country to another may 
rapidly amplify a very small shock, eventually producing a shock of such magnitude as 
to exceed the system’s threshold of structural stability. 
  In the model presented in this paper both dynamic instability and structural 
instability play a crucial role. The financial side of the market is seen as liable to 
dynamic instability and requires (dynamic) stabilisation interventions on the part of 
policy makers. Observed fluctuations, generally speaking, are unstable but not explosive 
because the fluctuations are constrained by a financial ceiling
10 beyond which the most 
fragile units go bankrupt. Fortunately often the inversion occurs before that limit 
precisely because policy, though it does not succeed in achieving the full dynamic 
stability of the system and may even help to provoke unintended fluctuations, is fairly 
successful in ensuring that the economy does not breach reasonable safety thresholds. 
However what makes the control of the economy particularly difficult is the growing 
role assumed by structural instability in an increasingly sophisticated financial 
economy. As we have argued above, very small shocks, rapidly amplified by herd 
behaviour, may induce the bankruptcy of many financial units as well as recession and 
depression for the economy as a whole.  
  These setbacks may be avoided through structural policy interventions that integrate 
the traditional counter-cyclical policies. The latter should intervene early in the boom as 
soon as a safe level of financial fragility is exceeded. These interventions should be 
cautiously “disinflationary” in the sense that they should reduce the positive value of 
E
pu that characterizes the inflationary regime in order to check the progressive increase 
in financial fragility without being deflationary, i.e. without shifting the economy into a 
“deflationary regime”. In addition this policy should, as far as possible, avoid increasing 
the rate of interest as this would augment the intertemporal financial ratio and therefore 
also the financial fragility of the units, particularly those more financially exposed. The 
space of manoeuvre for productive counter-cyclical policies is therefore extremely 
limited. Thus, it is crucial to intervene with structural measures that prevent an 
excessive increase in the financial fragility of economic units. This is done, e.g., in the 
                                                      
10 Our model defines a sort of limit cycle beyond which the financial side of the economy cannot go.  
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financial sector by imposing a limit on the maximum ratio between liabilities and assets 
of banks. The recent agreement between supervision authorities of industrialised 
countries called “Basel 2” aims to impose more rigour, although the crucial importance 
of the relationship between financial fragility and financial fluctuations is dangerously 
played down in its current version. 
  In particular we should keep in mind that we have to prevent an economy falling into 
a “deflationary trap”. In this case, as we have seen in the previous section only an 
injection of extra inflows in the form of more expenditure or more money from outside 
the private sector may reverse the vicious circle, provided that this injection is sufficient 
to shift the economy into the “inflationary” regime. In the 1930s the deflationary trap 
was triggered by the inadequate policy response to the Wall Street crash, a response that 
consisted in ill-judged deflationary measures. The industrial economies have learned 
from this experience and the teachings of Keynes how to react to financial crises 
characterised by insufficient aggregate demand. They have thus avoided falling into a 
deflationary regime or switching from it to an inflationary regime in order to avoid or 
abort a “deflationary trap”. However in recent times these acquisitions have been 
apparently questioned by approaches that give priority to monetary stability and 
balanced budgets and have a strong belief in the self-regulating ability of the market.
11 
Our model supports the idea that an economy which falls into a “deflationary trap” may 
be rescued only by public policy interventions aiming to shift the economy into an 
“inflationary” regime. However we have to stress that in logical terms a very moderate 
deficit spending and/or creation of money is sufficient to open the escape hatch from the 
deflation trap. Their optimal amount depends on the cyclical and structural 
characteristics of the depression to be faced. 
7    Concluding remarks 
  The model herein presented and discussed on the basis of a few simple numerical 
simulations of its dynamic behaviour is conceived as a first elementary illustration of an 
approach meant to analyse the interaction between dynamic and structural instability in 
a sophisticated financial economy. Financial fluctuations produced by the intrinsic 
dynamic instability of a globalised financial economy endogenously produce a change 
in the dynamic regime of the financial units that eventually brings about the bankruptcy 
of many of them and a generalised financial crisis often followed by a sharp downturn 
                                                      
11 Stiglitz (2002) gives a list of examples with particular reference to the deflationary policies forced by 
the IMF on economies characterised by a lack of aggregate demand.  
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of the economy. Attempts by the managers of the financial units, and by policy makers, 
to avoid or abort a severe financial crisis may be frustrated by the high degree of 
financial fragility of the units and the entire economy after a prolonged boom. In such a 
situation a very small shock, suddenly amplified by herd behaviour, may lead to the 
bankruptcy of many financial units and a financial crisis of the entire economy. Usual 
counter-cyclical policies are insufficient to ensure that such an outcome is avoided, as 
they have to be supplemented by, and coordinated with, structural policies aimed at 
preventing an excessive increase in financial fragility. The capital requirements and 
financial regulation performed by central banks are a case in point. However, after a 
prolonged boom, the financial fragility of the economy tends to increase to dangerous 
levels and a disinflationary policy becomes unavoidable. In the light of our model, 
however, it is crucial that such a policy should not become deflationary since such a 
policy regime could lock the financial side of the economy into a “deflationary trap” 
from which it would be very difficult to escape. 
  Among the first steps necessary to develop this approach we should mention: the 
introduction of financial stocks in the balance sheets of the financial units; a more 
satisfactory process of aggregation based on the parameters that characterise the 
distribution of financial units rather than on the linear approximation herein adopted; a 
more accurate modelling of the bankruptcy process; analysis of the crucial role of the 
interest rate in affecting both the dynamic and structural instability and their nexus, and 
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